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What do UK policymakers mean when they say that Britain’s strategic environment is returning to 
“multipolarity”? In realist international theory, polarity is a specific causal concept; the number of 
powers capable of balancing even the most capable other state(s) in the international system (“poles”) 
is taken to determine the system’s stability. Does the post-2017 appearance of polarity references in 
British security policy documents therefore reflect some unexpected UK renaissance of realist 
thought? Or is something else going on, as recent work by Ben Zala (2017) suggests? This article will 
demonstrate that, while UK official usage of the “multip—” word has indeed flourished recently, the 
term is actually being used in a more elastic, less bounded way than realism prescribes in order to 
generate other kinds of political effect. Specifically, “polarity” (and its “multi-” prefix) is used to 
characterise the behaviour of those major states that oppose Western-preferred international order, to 
elide Britain’s own relative power/status tensions, and to capture an expansive laundry-list of 
perceived international dangers. The article then discusses five ways in which a shift in polarity could 
negatively affect Britain; important consequences that merit preparatory contemplation, yet that an 
imprecise, catch-all understanding of “multipolarity” too readily obscures.  
 2 
Across the Western world, a sense has emerged that relative power is shifting to major non-
Western states. This does not mean that European and North American power – particularly 
its concentration in the United States – is suddenly about to collapse, but simply that three 
post-Cold War decades of strong growth among large emerging markets (China most 
prominently) have given such states new wherewithal to constrain and oppose Western policy 
when it affects their own interests. And in the UK context, this has manifested itself since 
2018 as the appearance of the term “multipolarity” in official policy statements.  
Polarity is a crucial concept in International Relations (IR) theory. For structural 
realists, the distribution of capabilities determines the stability of the international system, in 
terms of its tendencies towards war or peace between major states. The number of “poles” – 
that is, great powers with sufficient capability to balance the forces of other states meeting 
the same elevated threshold – is therefore a central causal variable in such theories.
1
 
Specifically, while a unipolar system – as characterised the extreme concentration of relative 
power in the United States after 1990 – necessarily lacks potential for true great-power 
conflict (because there is only one true great power), a multipolar system does not benefit 
from such impediments. As such, if the world is indeed returning to a polarity of more than 
one, that could have fundamental implications for the security environment and associated 
strategic choices of every state operating in the international system, Britain included. Yet is 
this what contemporary UK invokers of “multipolarity” mean? Does policymakers’ recent 
(re)discovery of the discourse of polarity reflect a specific causal claim about the number of 
great powers and the implications of changes in that number for UK strategy? Or is the claim 
actually fuzzier than that, serving as a form of nebulous political rhetoric? This article 
addresses these questions in order to advance the precision – and thus strategic utility – of 
Britain’s contemporary debate.  
In fact, the unfolding UK discourse of “multipolarity” can be seen to reflect the 
country’s own tortured concerns with power and status. On the one hand, the UK is deeply 
invested in the club goods provided by the Western hegemonic order that US unipolarity 
delivered after the Cold War. American power – infused with the ideational but buttressed by 
the material – has delivered security and prosperity for Britain since 1945 in a way that could 
easily not have occurred under slightly different circumstances (Schake 2017), and that US 
relative power advantage increased even further in 1990. On the other hand, Britain has its 
own enduring obsession with national “greatness”: a politically contested, but undeniably 
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present, understanding of a special national “role” in the world. Since Britain is evidently not 
an economic or military superpower, but nonetheless wishes to be considered influential, this 
produces a hankering for a conception of “greatness” understood in terms beyond relative 
material capacity alone. And on still another hand – to contrive a three-armed metaphor – 
Britain’s strategic and broader political context is such that there is no common 
understanding of what “polarity” actually means; if polarity itself has no common definition, 
then any inferences about the consequences of its increase will lie on similarly contested 
ground. So, while the term has recently found a place in official documents and discourse that 
it did not previously enjoy, it is also deployed as a political speech-act: to mean and prescribe 
different things by different actors depending on their policies, preferences, and proclivities. 
In summary, then, this article argues that US-dominated unipolarity is indeed giving way to a 
system of more than one pole, but that while official policy statements have recently started 
to recognise this shift, ideationally-motivated imprecision in conceptualisations of polarity 
risks obscuring the strategic adaptation that is needed to optimally cope with such a change.  
 The article proceeds as follows. First, it surveys the strategic backdrop, in the form of 
a brief history of the UK priorities and associated force posture that the US-dominated 
“unipolar moment” enabled.
2
 Second, it discusses Britain’s newfound eagerness for 
discussions of “multipolarity” – along with various related terms, such as “peer adversary” – 
and the confusion that surrounds their invocation. Third, it considers Britain’s own ideational 
obsession with “great powerness” and the policy contradictions that it engenders. Fourth, it 
assesses how the relative power shifts that are afoot in the wider world might affect the UK’s 
strategic environment; shifts that – domestic political actors’ hand-wringing about Britain’s 
own greatness or otherwise aside – are already affecting UK security policy debates. In 
closing, it offers some recommendations for British strategy in a multipolar age.  
 The article concludes that while Britain has not been a systemic “pole” since 1945 
and will not be one again,
3
 the country remains an important major power in the Euro-
Atlantic region (conceived broadly to include the Mediterranean, South Atlantic, and High 
North). The UK also retains some residual capacity for – and interest in – modest strategic 
involvement in the non-Atlantic world. However, a lack of clarity over what multipolarity 
actually means coupled with Britain’s own ideational obsession with international “role” 
risks precluding the prudent national strategy required to defend and advance UK security 
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and prosperity in the environment of diffused non-Western power centres now emerging. As 
such, Britain’s discourse of (multi)polarity and relative power is not just some academic 
curiosity. In fact, it has very real consequences for both Britons and the many allies that 
benefit from UK security commitments.   
 
The Backstory: UK Posture through Unipolarity and Its Twilight  
The collapse of the Soviet Union over 1989-91 removed the sole power capable of 
meaningful opposition to US global preponderance. Of course, the Soviet economy was in 
trouble long before the late 1980s; the USSR was only a “pole” in terms of the size of its 
military forces, rather than any long-spent industrial prowess, by the time Mikhail Gorbachev 
attempted his ill-fated programme of domestic reform. Nonetheless, the sudden 
disappearance of the closest thing that Washington faced to a “peer-competitor” freed the 
now-unipolar United States and its developed, capable allies – Britain foremost among them 
– to tackle foreign-policy concerns beyond the previously all-consuming task of balancing 
Soviet power. The 1990s were accordingly a decade of relatively successful multilateral 
cooperation (Rubinstein 1994), defence budgetary consolidation under the banner of the so-
called “peace dividend” (Sabin 1993), and – most prominently – growing appetite for 
humanitarian intervention to militarily oppose atrocities committed in other countries that 
violated Westerners’ sense of acceptable conduct (Daddow 2009; Wertheim 2010). 
Moving on from the 1990s, UK foreign and defence policy was dominated through 
the first decade of the twenty-first century by London’s participation in the coalition response 
to the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks on Britain’s most important ally, the United States, 
along with smaller-scale attacks from similar sources on the UK itself (e.g. 7 July 2005). The 
ensuing “Global War on Terror” (GWoT) – as incensed, fearful US policymakers dubbed 
their expansive commitment to eradicate anti-Western Islamists – and the Iraq/Afghan 
campaigns that it spawned consumed resources and attention to the exclusion of pretty much 
all else in British defence. Of course, other routine military commitments continued as 
normal; small pockets of troops, aircraft, and warships deployed hither and thither, while the 
Royal Navy (RN) sustained its unceasing nuclear-armed submarine patrols – the ultimate 
backstop of deterrence against some re-emergent state-based threat. The 1990s’ humanitarian 




 Nonetheless, Britain’s corps-sized commitment to the Iraq invasion, divisional-
sized embroilment in Afghanistan, and the bloody, intractable counter-insurgency (COIN) 
campaigns that each occupation descended into coloured the whole of UK defence (Blagden 
2009).  
Nowhere was this more apparent than in the outcome of successive official defence 
reviews and the military force postures that they delivered. The 1998 Strategic Defence 
Review (SDR), conducted by the “New” Labour government shortly after it won power 
following eighteen years in Opposition, had promised a balanced force oriented around 
maritime and airborne power projection (HM Government 1998). It marked a significant shift 
from the force posture of the Cold War, certainly, with the need to fight for control of both 
the Northeast Atlantic and Central Europe seemingly at an end (Taylor 2010, 11-12; 
Blackburn 2015). But it still promised naval, air, and mechanised ground forces of substantial 
scale, in line with the then-influential view – following recent experiences in the Balkans – 
that Britain could be a humanitarian “force for good” around the world. Over the ensuing 
decade, however, the Iraq and Afghan commitments relentlessly gutted the 1998 SDR’s 
promised force. Fighting two protracted, sizeable wars on a tight defence budget and with 
only narrowly bounded additional contingency funding from the Treasury saw the sorts of 
air, naval, and heavier ground forces best suited to defence against hostile states 
progressively sacrificed on the altar of a lighter, more deployable Army – and supporting air-
maritime logistics tail – optimised for COIN (Cornish and Dorman 2009; Blagden 2009). 
This situation was compounded by the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 
– the first such full review since 1998 – conducted by the new Conservative government, 
which had been elected against the backdrop of the 2008-9 financial crisis and associated 
fiscal overstretch with a mandate for swingeing budgetary consolidation (HM Government 
2010a; Blagden 2009; Edmunds 2010; Cornish and Dorman 2011). With the Army still knee-
deep in Afghanistan, it was spared cuts to entire capability areas (although it still lost 
personnel). For the RAF and particularly the RN, meanwhile, the 2010 SDSR saw steep 
reductions. The RAF lost one of its three classes of combat jets (among many other personnel 
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and equipment reductions), while the RN lost people and warships of all kinds, including – 
most iconically – its two remaining fixed-wing aircraft carriers.
5
  
What does this potted history have to do with international-systemic polarity, a 
concept rarely mentioned in UK security policy at the time? The in-vogue mantras of the era 
– that “war had changed”, was now fought “among the people” (rather than against state 
adversaries), and that COIN and terrorism would be the enduring preoccupation of British 
defence (Blagden 2009) – were in fact by-products of a particular international-systemic 
distribution of power.
6
 UK forces could be optimised for campaigns against weak- and non-
state adversaries precisely because – as America’s closest and most capable ally in an 
American-dominated post-Cold War unipolar system – there were no major powers capable 
of meaningfully opposing Western interests. Those actors that did seek to oppose US 
hegemony had to resort to “asymmetric” tactics (e.g. terrorism) as a way of imposing costs on 
the superpower, as seen both on 9/11 and in US-opposed “rogue” states’ particular interest in 
obtaining chemical, biological, or ideally nuclear means of deterrence – hence the ensuing 
“GWoT” and its conflation with armed counter-proliferation. Britain’s military commitment 
to Iraq and Afghanistan was motivated by a belief in their inherent liberal-progressive 
promise coupled to a more “realist” grand-strategic heuristic – embedded in London since the 
Suez debacle of 1956 – that it is in UK interests to bind American power to British security 
by hugging Washington close (Porter 2018a).
7
 But such commitment was made possible by 
the absence of meaningful state adversaries under the most acutely unipolar concentration of 
power seen since the height of the Roman Empire. In such a system, there still remained a 
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clutch of “non-polar” major powers conceivably capable of thwarting direct US intervention 
in their own territory, Britain included (Monteiro 2014, 43-45). But such states were 
otherwise incapable of effectively opposing American foreign policy preferences (Monteiro 
2014), with the US enjoying unprecedented command of the global “commons” (Posen 
2003). Such post-1989 systemic conditions meant that for a capable second-tier power 
enjoying a reliable and comprehensive US security guarantee, there was suddenly strategic 
“spare capacity” for pursuing other liberal foreign-policy preferences – at the barrel of a gun, 
where desired – rather than focusing military effort on defence against other powerful states, 
as had characterised Britain’s strategic history prior to 1990. Such conditions also account for 
the growth of international law and institutions since the Cold War, advocacy of which has 
been another central plank of UK strategy.  
The happy illusion underpinning this UK posture – that Western preponderance was 
so comprehensive as to ensure that there would never again be meaningful opposition from 
capable state adversaries (Blagden 2009) – was shattered for British policy elites and voters 
alike in 2014. Russia’s operation to lop Crimea off Ukraine and subsequently freeze any 
further moves in Kiev towards EU/NATO alignment by destabilising the eastern part of the 
country through a combination of large-scale conventional coercion and deniable subversion 
proved highly effective. This series of events, along with the accompanying deterrent 
signalling (e.g. Korsunskaya 2014), brought home to Western policymakers – in a way that 
even Russia’s Georgian intervention of 2008 had not – that there was once again a major 
power in Europe with sufficiently recapitalised capabilities and ample resolve to oppose 
further NATO encroachment.
8
 Russia’s ability to frustrate Western preferences in Syria and 
China’s increasingly capable area-denial perimeter over its maritime periphery have further 
emphasised this new reality, as has both powers’ readiness to disregard the Western-backed 
international “rules” by which UK enthusiasts had set so much store.  
That new major powers would rise – or resurge, in Russia’s case – and then use their 
newfound capabilities to protect and advance their interests, even if that means opposing 
Western interests in the process, was always probable. One consequence of expanded cross-
border factor flows of the kind that characterised post-1990 economic globalisation is the 
diffusion of productive capacity to states not yet at the leading edge of the development 
frontier, as capital, skills, and technology seek higher returns in environs of greater relative 
scarcity. As such, the very economic system that Western powers had created after 1945 and 
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then expanded globally following the Soviet Union’s demise was also the system that gave 
large emerging economies the scope to experience substantial “catch-up convergence” 
development gains, with major implications for such powers’ national capabilities (Blagden 
2015, 334-37). Foremost among such states has been China, to the point where the United 
States now faces the most economically potent rising rival since its own emergence as a great 
power.
9
 Russia, for its part, was never the same kind of “emerging” economy – rather than 
new industrialisation, it underwent catastrophic deindustrialisation in the 1990s followed by 
stabilisation and (partial) recovery in the 2000s – but the demand for Russian hydrocarbons 
and enduring technological specialisms that the post-Cold War globalization era created has 
nonetheless been instrumental in restoring Moscow’s capabilities to oppose Western policy.  
Of course, none of this means that the United States is about to lose its overall 
development edge, military superiority, or associated systemic leadership – all measures on 
which it remains far ahead of China (a country beset by development challenges of its own), 
let alone Russia (Beckley 2018). But one does not need to forecast the collapse of American 
power to still see that other major states have now acquired sufficient capability to constrain 
US behaviour and threaten US-aligned interests, especially in their own regions, and 
especially given the scale of global demands on American capabilities (Shifrinson and 
Beckley 2013, 172-77; Blagden 2015). US unipolarity, in short, is now less concentrated and 
more constrained than it was in the 1990s and 2000s, and possibly even now better 
characterised as a variant of bi- or multipolarity, albeit still favourably skewed towards US 
power and interests. While this latter fault-line is a subject for debate beyond the remit of this 
article, the point is that relative power is shifting as it diffuses away from the particular 
concentration seen in the post-Cold War West. And UK strategy, for its part, is starting to 
recognise that fact – but still with much confusion about what the erosion and possible end of 
unipolarity might mean and imply.  
 
Contemporary British Invocations of “Polarity”: Clarity and Confusion 
Since the Ukraine-Russia shock of 2014, in which a major power used force to redraw 
European territorial boundaries and militarily coerce NATO states out of pursuing their 
preferences, discussions of state-based threats have returned to prominence in UK strategic 
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discourse. The 2010 SDSR had not completely dismissed state-based threats, but beyond its 
focus on terrorism and insurgency – plus emerging risks, like pandemics, climate conflict, 
and cyberattack – it saw only a need to retain a baseline deterrent and “the ability to 
regenerate [conventional] capabilities given sufficient strategic notice” [emphasis added] 
(HM Government 2010, 10). Its post-Crimean successor, by contrast, promised to “respond 
robustly to the re-emergence of state-based threats” (HM Government 2015, 11)
10
 – revealing 
that 2014’s escalation of Russian behaviour prompted this assessment of a “re-emerged state 
threat” [sic], rather than the recovery of Russian power (since such capability-growth was 
also evident back in 2010). Likewise, whereas SDSR 2010 named Moscow as only a 
“partner” for “dialogue” (HM Government 2010, 61), SDSR 2015 made Russia the main 
subject of a sub-section on “the resurgence of state-based threats” (HM Government 2015, 
18). The military capabilities prescribed by that SDSR for the decade ahead, “Future Force 
2025”, were correspondingly reoriented away from COIN and back to state-on-state 
defence.
11
 Still, this 2015 iteration – as is the way with high-profile public policy statements 
that must guard against adverse diplomatic consequences (Blagden 2018a, 726-27) – 
remained reticent to name other major powers as anything other than valued friends, despite 
their sometimes less-than-friendly conduct.
12
 As such, while the post-Crimea SDSR reflected 
a reintroduction to top-line UK official security policy discourse of concern over capable 
state adversaries, it was still hardly some full-throated recognition of a multipolar threat 
environment.  
 Looking beyond the high-level statement of UK strategic priorities and posture 
provided by the SDSR, however, the “multip—” word and its corollaries have started to 
appear across the British security policy landscape. Launching the Public Consultation for the 
Modernising Defence Programme (MDP) – an inter-SDSR mini-review of UK military needs 
– in March 2018, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) stated explicitly that “the rules-based 
international order is under significant pressure from emerging multipolarity” [emphasis 
added] (HM Government 2018b, 1). The MDP itself, when eventually published in the 
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December of that year, asserted that “After almost three decades of relative international 
stability, the world has now re-entered a period of persistent and intense state competition” 
(HM Government 2018c, 11) – not far from an official UK government concession of the end 
of the post-Cold War “unipolar moment”, albeit without usage of the “polar” term itself. The 
MDP also pledged to create a Net Assessment Unit in the MOD to look “across all 
dimensions of military competition to assess how the capability choices of both friends and 
foes may play out”, in further recognition of the need to take the relative strategic balance 
vis-à-vis other powerful states seriously for the first time since the 1980s (HM Government 
2018c, 17). The 2017-18 National Security Capability Review (NSCR) that spawned the 
MDP – a broader security/intelligence review concluded just after Russia’s fatal March 2018 
use of a military nerve agent in Salisbury, and bearing a vociferous foreword from the Prime 
Minister reflecting that development – also featured a section on “intensifying” state 
competition (although it still placed such competition behind terrorism in its list of security 
concerns) (HM Government 2018a, 6). The bureaucratic-political incentives for such moves 
are not hard to discern, moreover (Allison and Halperin 1972); articulating a transformed 
new threat environment may be a good way to extract resources and attention from the rest of 
government.  
 Moving outside the central MOD and Cabinet Office NSCR/MDP machinery, further 
direct references and indirect allusions to multipolarity abound. The Development, Concepts, 
and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) – the MOD think-tank tasked with, among other things, 
conducting the Global Strategic Trends (GST) futures analysis programme to inform defence 
planners – has long maintained that power diffusion away from the West would eventually 
bring about the rise of newly-capable rivals.
13
 But in its 2018 version of GST, unlike its 2014 
predecessor, DCDC first invokes “multipolarity” as an explicit characterisation of the future 
– albeit as only one possible future among others (HM Government 2018d, 24-25). Turning 
from the executive to legislative branches of government, meanwhile, organs of Parliament 
have also come to pay close attention to ongoing relative power shifts. The House of 
Lords/Commons Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS), for example, 
incorporated the language of “competitive multipolarity” and “peer military forces” (naming 
Russia and China) into its 2018 report on the changing UK national security environment 
(JCNSS 2018, 13, 18). The House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC), for its part, did 
not use the “multipolar” label explicitly in its 2018 analysis of the threat environment that the 
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MDP would have to confront – but it did deploy the term “peer adversaries”, implying 
multiple powers of approximately equal capability (i.e. close to a definition of multipolarity) 
(HCDC 2018, 27, 37, 44). 
 With such discussion of relative power shifts and resurgent state-based threats finally 
permeating policy, even if a little later than certain scholars would have preferred, is the UK 
now well placed analytically to cope with a post-unipolar security environment? 
Unfortunately, despite Britain’s security policy community reaching clarity on one important 
axis – that US-underpinned Western preponderance may not last forever and that new threats 
can be expected to correspondingly emerge – confusion remains along others. Tellingly, the 
multipolarity-invoking 2018 MDP Consultation went on to explain that “Increasingly 
sophisticated capabilities are being used in new domains of warfare, both by state 
actors…and by non-state actors that have diffused and disaggregated” (HM Government 
2018b, 1). This elaboration of “multipolarity” (the subject of the preceding sentence) with 
reference to new domains of warfare and diffuse, disaggregated non-state actors belies a 
common theme of power-diffusion discussions in UK strategic discourse: “multi-” is often 
taken to mean not just a specific category of sufficiently capable states (“poles”), but new 
dangers of many kinds.  
For structural realists, à la Kenneth Waltz or John Mearsheimer, “polarity” is tightly 
defined by a stringent criterion, namely the capacity to balance independently against even 
the most powerful other state in the system without recourse to the charity of allies.
14
 Such a 
specific understanding may itself be unhelpful in certain contexts, especially since nuclear 
weapons gave even conventionally weak states the ability to deter through the threat of 
unbearable punishment, but it is valuably parsimonious. For the various official UK policy 
statements referenced above, however, “multipolarity” is all things to all people. For DCDC’s 
GST, “multipolarity” is only one possible world, alongside three other posited options – 
“multilateralism”, “network of actors”, and “fragmentation” – belying an understanding of 
multipolarity not as a distribution of capabilities but as a behavioural condition (HM 
Government 2018d, 21). And while such GST documents over the years have indeed focused 
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on the diffusion of power, they have covered everything from states to transnational civil 
society groups, terrorist franchises, lone hackers, mega-cities, and super-viruses within the 
scope of such diffusion; the 2018 edition, while invoking multipolarity, continues that trend. 
For the MDP, multipolarity was certainly associated with the resurgence of state-based 
conflict – but it was also implicitly associated simply with All Bad Things that UK Defence 
will have to confront, from Russian tanks, to cyber-enabled terrorists, to the resource 
conflicts born of climate change.
15
 Likewise, for the NSCR from which the MDP was spun-
off, “resurgen[t] state-based threats” featured as one element of a laundry-list, alongside 
terrorism, crime, natural hazards, and more besides. For the JCNSS and HCDC, meanwhile, 
the strategic environment is increasingly clouded by “peer adversaries” – but are these peers 
of the US, a systemic superpower, or merely the UK, a regional power with a bit of extra-
regional influence? If we are talking about US peers, then that would indeed mean genuine 
multipolarity – but the UK cannot simultaneously call them “peers”, since any peer of the US 
is significantly more than a peer to the UK. By contrast, if they are merely peers to the UK, 
then they are not peers to the US – and unipolarity therefore remains intact. Most likely, their 
“peerness” or otherwise vis-à-vis both Britain and America depends on the regional context 
in which they are operating (e.g. Russia has much more capability vis-à-vis NATO in Eastern 
Europe than it does in the Western Hemisphere). Yet such caveats and qualifications 
diminish the clarity and utility of the overall labelling exercise.  
All of this is consistent, of course, with Ben Zala’s recent (2017) identification of the 
discursive power and contestation generated by invocations of polarity. “Multipolarity” 
meaning different things to different people is not some UK-specific trait, but a feature of 
linguistic efforts to stratify political actors by capability and status tiers in many national 
strategic contexts. What might be peculiar to the UK, however, is the particular tension 
generated between capability-centric and status-centric approaches to such thresholds. These 
tensions are the focus of the next section.  
 
Britain’s Tortured Relationship with “Great Powerness” 
Since 1945, Britain has remained obsessed with performing the social role – and maintaining 
the associated status – of “great power” (McCourt 2014a). On any materially-specified 
metric, the UK ceased to be a “pole” at the end of the Second World War; this is not to say 
that Britain was suddenly trivial or that poles must be perfectly equal, but compared to the 
                                                     
15
 This tendency pervades contemporary UK security policy, owing to the post-2010 design of the National 
Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) from which all other policy plans follow (Blagden 2018a). 
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United States and Soviet Union, it no longer met the criterion of being capable of 
independent balancing against the most powerful state(s) in the system without reliance on 
allies (Waltz 1979, 162; Monteiro 2014, 3). Even theorists who contended that there was 
more to “great powerness” than capability alone, in the form of rights and responsibilities to 
uphold some conception of international “order” – i.e. an international-societal dimension – 
still maintained that such powers should be capable of exercising regional preponderance 
(Bull 1977, 203, 13-19). Again, the USA and USSR could meet this criterion in their 
respective zones of control, but post-1945 Britain – for all of its commitment to the Anglo-
centric international order that it had done much to create – could not.
16
 Nonetheless, the 
desire to retain the elevated influence and standing of a “special” role has remained strong 
among British elites and citizens alike
17
 – not unreasonably, given the esteem and other 
benefits that such elevation brings – with keen support from a Washington in search of allies 
and a Paris in a similar situation (McCourt 2014b, 160). This preference manifests itself as a 
continued appetite (Daddow 2015), despite 70-plus years of post-1945 defence cuts, for 
acting militarily abroad to uphold Britain’s conception of international order. At the same 
time, London has also still sought to retain enough capability in certain areas to at least make 
an effort at providing national security without wholesale reliance on allies – to remain a 
major power on “realist” criteria, as well as roleplaying ones (Blagden 2018b).
18
 Indeed, the 
2015 SDSR promised to retain a UK “ability to undertake war-fighting independently”, even 
as it also stated that Britain “continues to look to [America] to shape global stability” (HM 
Government 2015, 51). 
These different kinds of pressures can pull national strategy in different directions. 
Consider the 2015 SDSR’s three National Security Objectives, of which the first two – 
“protect our people” and “project our global influence” – could recommend diametrically 
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 Of course, the USSR itself was never a true “equal” of the USA; Soviet GDP peaked at a mere 44.5% of the 
US total in 1975 (Maddison 2003), while Soviet technology never matched NATO’s overall lead. Nonetheless, 
given a combination of favourable PPP terms, willingness to impose domestic privations, and proximate 
location vis-à-vis the pivotal Western European theatre, the USSR was capable of deploying sufficient military 
capability to balance the forces (and associated regional policy preferences) of even the most capable other 
state(s) in the system – a threshold that Britain has not been able to meet since 1945. Mao’s China was also 
unable to meet this regional balancing criterion, given its inability to thwart American dominance of the Pacific 
Rim, for all that the 1950s People’s Liberation Army was sufficient to thwart limited US war aims in Korea. 
17
 To be sure, voters are often less enthusiastic about military intervention than policy elites. Nonetheless, as 
recently as 2013 – i.e. even after the government’s failed attempt to win Parliamentary approval for military 
intervention in Syria on the back of post-Iraq/-Afghanistan public war-weariness – 75 percent of Britons thought 
the UK should play a major role in the world to promote its economic interests, while 65 percent thought the 
same to promote national security interests (YouGov 2013, 7-8). 
18
 This is consistent with – and complemented by – a posture of “strategic latency”, whereby smaller-than-useful 
pockets of multiple capabilities are retained on the understanding that they could be scaled back up in a more 
dangerous future threat environment (Cornish and Dorman 2015). 
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opposed policies (i.e. if influence-motivated power projection embroils the state in some sort 
of conflict that jeopardises the people’s protection). These are not just hypotheticals, 
moreover: with RN warships increasingly operating alongside US and Japanese counterparts 
in the China Seas, Britain is consciously accepting some increased risk of confrontation with 
the twenty-first century’s rising superpower (jeopardising people-protection) in the name of 
asserting a British conception of “rules-based order” (i.e. influence-projection).
19
 Indeed, the 
very coding of influence projection as a co-equal strategic end, as opposed to merely a means 
to other ends, itself tells of a country with a particular interest in international role 
performance. Either way, the core point stands: despite having ceased to be an international-
systemic “pole” on a material capability definition in 1945, Britain retains a preference for 
continued “great power” status through discharging a particular performative role (where 
“role” is understood as a bundle of socially ascribed behavioural expectations in a given 
context, like “father” or “customer” (McCourt 2014b, 160)). All of this supports Zala’s 
observation that the political discourse of polarity actually reflects and reinforces collective 
concern over status hierarchies more than it corresponds to political scientists’ concern for 
measuring capability distributions (Zala 2017, 12-14).  
 These tangled preferences further account for – and tie into – Britain’s currently 
confused polarity debate. On the one hand, Britain has been a tremendous beneficiary of the 
US-led Western hegemonic system. With its own national power much diminished after 
1945, the UK managed to closely align US power with its own preferences such that – 
occasional ructions notwithstanding – Britain has continued to enjoy expansive national 
security, favourable economic relations, and an elevated diplomatic position while also 
foregoing sufficient defence spending to afford a generous welfare state. The quid pro quo 
has been active UK support for US hegemony, to the point where Britain’s principal grand-
strategic choice has been to serve as a cog – an important and valued cog, certainly, but a cog 
nevertheless – in another power’s grand strategy (Porter 2010, 9). In polarity terms, this 
means that Britain is deeply invested in the club goods that have been supplied by a US-
dominated unipolar system – a distribution of power that many had come to assume as a 
structural “fact” of the international system – and is aware that the consequences of its 
erosion are unlikely to be favourable.  
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 For description and enthusiastic advocacy of this behavior, see Hemmings and Rogers (2019). Such risk does 
not mean that it is necessarily the wrong choice, of course, but neither should policymakers or analysts be 
deluded that such choices are costless.  
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On the other hand, however, having spent 70 years with a foreign superpower as the 
ultimate guarantor of national survival, Britain’s strategy community is not accustomed to 
prioritised demarcation of threats by power and proximity. In line with its role-based concern 
for “great powerness” under the assumption of US-assured security, UK strategic discourse 
struggles to distinguish between well-armed states and weak terrorists, between proximate 
threats and distant concerns, between the existentially vital and the ideologically desirable. 
Unbounded assertions of a “global” mission to uphold British “values”, based on a moralistic 
division between “good” Britain and (implicitly) “bad” adversaries, are preferred over 
recognitions of limits to UK power and interests vis-à-vis the power and interests of others. 
US strategic discourse displays the same moralistic traits, of course – but then, Washington 
still has an unprecedented concentration of national power at its disposal. The recent British 
obsession with upholding “rules-based order” – a term invoked no fewer than thirty times by 
the 2015 SDSR – without reflecting on whose interests such “rules” are designed (not) to 
serve, which transgressions are most geopolitically salient, or the possible confrontations 
(and their costs) implied by such “upholding” is a case in point. The willingness to fit threat 
assessments to a pre-determined defence spending threshold – NATO’s much-reified two-
percent-of-GDP target – rather than first assessing the threat environment and then deciding 
how much defence spending it necessitates is another (HCDC 2018). The assumption that 
command of the global “commons” and associated resupply from global markets will always 
belong to “the West” (read: come from the US) is one more (Blagden 2018b, 11-15). And the 
belief of some that the international environment can be transformed by simply having 
enough faith in the British character and inherent righteousness of the UK position is yet 
another (Saunders 2018). 
Britain has thus been free to go through the performative motions of confronting 
perceived threats to its conception of international order, in furtherance of a social conception 
of its world “role”, without actually carrying the buck for its own survival – and this reflects 
itself in UK discourse around power and polarity. The confused invocation of “peer 
adversaries”, without specifying who these adversaries are “peers” to, is particularly telling in 
this regard; it belies a Britain simultaneously keen to claim independent great-power status 
while consuming the low-cost, high-quality fruits of continued US primacy. Specifying a 
comparator for such “peerness” would force a choice between rejecting US hegemony 
(undesirable, since Britain wants to prop it up in order to continue consuming its goods if at 
all possible) or accepting clear subordination to another rank of powers (undesirable, since 
Britain wishes to retain and maximise its esteem and influence). Failing to specify whether 
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these “peer adversaries” are peers to the US, peers to the UK, or somehow both therefore 
avoids any such hard choices. But it also avoids any clarity over (a) systemic polarity in 
general and (b) whether Britain in particular seeks to claim any kind of great-power “polar” 
status for itself. 2018’s flurry of hand-wringing about whether the UK can remain a “Tier 1” 
military power (Press Association 2018) – an obviously absurd notion, since no-one can 
reasonably claim that Britain (or any other state) is currently in the same military “tier” as the 
US – betrays this same obsession with hierarchical status rankings alongside collectively 
useful ambiguity over Britain’s own claimed great-powerness (wanting the benefits of US 
subordination and the standing of great-power equality).
20
 Such “tier” claims invoke some 
distribution of polarity, while also – by placing Britain implausibly in the “top” one – 
necessarily obscuring its presumed configuration. Under such conditions of conceptual 
slipperiness and empirical imprecision, it is hardly surprising that many contemporary UK 
security policy organisations’ use of “multipolarity” slides readily from a specific distribution 
of relative material power, as a structural realist would understand it, into simply meaning 
“lots of dangerous things that Britain must confront if we are to remain our kind of country”.  
 
The Impact of Global Power Shifts on Britain 
If power actually is shifting in the world – not in some vague sense, meaning to social media 
or insurgents, but in a specific sense, to rising non-Western economies with their own 
foreign-policy priorities – and US unipolarity is correspondingly eroding, what does that 
mean for UK security? In short, having discussed the various ways in which “multipolarity” 
is being used in British strategic discourse, what are the conditions under which it should be 
invoked?  
 At least five potential implications of the end of unipolarity – understood as the 
emergence of at least one other state capable of independently balancing the post powerful 
state in the system – present themselves for the UK strategic environment. First, and most 
                                                     
20
 Of course, UK strategic options do not distil to some false binary of “independent superpower” versus “US 
vassal”. As noted above, even under unipolarity, there has still been a structurally-definable category of major 
powers that – although not “poles” – possess leeway unavailable to most states. And within this tier, different 
states choose different strategies; whereas China and Russia seek to balance the US superpower, and France 
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other layers of deep integration into multilateral organisations, regimes, and networks (what two successive 
Foreign Secretaries respectively referred to as a “global hub” strategy (Blitz, Dombey, and Stephens 2007) and 
“networked foreign policy” (Hague 2010)). Nonetheless, while states face plenty of choices in terms of how to 
behave in order to best serve their interests, power is not the same as strategy and “greatness powerness” can 
thus have only two meanings: whether others see a state as discharging a great-power role/status (i.e. 
intersubjective recognition) or whether a state is capable of mobilising sufficient national resources to 
independently secure their interests against the possible predations of others (i.e. an objective criterion). Britain 
prizes both understandings, but they sometimes stand in tension nonetheless (Blagden 2018b).         
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pressing for Britain, has been the resurgence of Russia from its post-Cold War economic 
nadir of the 1990s (Blagden 2015, 338-39). Of course, with an economy smaller than those of 
Italy and Canada as of 2018,
21
 and facing crippling headwinds,
22
 Russia is never again going 
to be a meaningful industrial competitor to America and will struggle to even fulfil its 
convergence potential vis-à-vis Western Europe. Nonetheless, years of strong economic 
growth through the 2000s, favourable PPP terms, and a willingness to spend a larger share of 
national output on defence than is seen among the welfare states of NATO have allowed 
Russia to reform and modernise its military forces to the point where they are the largest and 
(on most measures) most capable in Europe. As evidenced by Ukraine’s experience, 
moreover, Moscow is capable of multiplying the strategic effects of its forces through astute 
use of covert action, proxies, subversion, communications disruption, disinformation, and so 
forth.
23
 US forces remain far superior to their Russian counterparts on a global level, to be 
sure, but those forces are not “automatically” available for European defence and do not 
preclude effective Russian subversion, concentrations of local superiority, or escalation to 
nuclear brinksmanship if sub-nuclear strategic options fail.  
Moscow, in short, now has the coercive means to advance its regional interests once 
again. Foremost among these are thwarting, weakening, and ideally breaking NATO. Note 
that such a preference does not mark Russia as “bad” or “evil”, since Moscow has sound and 
understandable strategic reasons to wish to roll back a powerful alliance that (a) was created 
for its containment and (b) expanded across former Soviet allies and territory during the post-
1989 depths of Russian weakness. Nonetheless, targeting Britain – as the European NATO 
state that has historically displayed the greatest combination of capability and resolve to 
balance Russia – could prove integral to any such efforts to weaken or break the Alliance, 
and this would obviously harm UK security. All of this is also taking place at a time when the 
US is becoming less equipped to shoulder all of its allies’ defence burdens simultaneously as 
it focuses on balancing the rising Chinese peer-competitor in Asia (see below).  
In the face of these international-structural conditions, Britain faces pressing 
questions for its strategic posture – understood as the selection, configuration, and direction 
of levers of national power, ultimately buttressed by military forces – all of which can be 
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 These include demographic decline, productivity-impeding corruption, creativity-stifling authoritarianism, 
Western sanctions, lack of trust from potential foreign investors, volatile global hydrocarbon demand, and the 
“crowding out” of productive investment by the resource-extractive sector (Blagden 2015, 338).  
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 Such tactics are often now dubbed part of “hybrid warfare”, although the term is banal – every strategic action 
in history has been “hybrid” in some such way.  
 18 
traced back to the fraying of unipolarity and the waning of US preponderance. What if, as 
part of some limited Alliance response to a Baltic or Norwegian contingency (say), Russia 
faces incentives to destroy NATO’s stand-off air power, including RAF stations, RN carriers, 
and MOD command/control facilities? How might efforts to preserve the US alliance 
commitment to NATO by supporting Washington’s global strategy – such as deploying 
British forces to the Gulf or East Asia – suck Britain into commitments that are costly on 
their own terms, jeopardise the UK’s core NATO balancing effort in Europe, and/or bring 
London into confrontation with Beijing and/or Moscow? What if some Russian action in 
Estonia/Svalbard/etc sees NATO/Britain – with little help from a disinterested or distracted 
Washington, in a worst-case scenario – left choosing between acceptance of the fait accompli 
(i.e. the breaking of NATO), costly attempted recapture in the face of a formidable Russian 
anti-access/area-denial perimeter, or perilous escalation to nuclear coercion? And what would 
London do if – as part of an effort to weaken NATO by dissuading the Alliance’s only 
offshore European power, i.e. the UK, from contributing to continental defence – Moscow 
undertook a concerted campaign of coercion against Britain itself? Patterns of Russian naval 
activity, bomber patrols, cyber/informational subversion, and chemical/radiological weapons 
use in and around Britain imply that the latter scenario is already not too far away.
24
 
Second, but bound up with the previous point, the erosion of unipolarity means that 
the United States will be less willing – and eventually less able – to shoulder all of its allies’ 
defence burdens simultaneously (Blagden 2015, 339-41). As noted above, while China has 
not yet reached Soviet levels of relative military spending or capability, its economy is 
already larger vis-à-vis its American counterpart than the USSR’s ever was – and it still has 
the convergence potential to become even larger. East Asia will therefore be the principal 
theatre in which Washington must put forth its balancing effort to safeguard its allies, 
maritime control, and other aspects of its favoured regional order.  
This presents two opposite risks for the UK, which can respectively be dubbed 
“abandonment” and “entanglement” (or “chain-ganging”). On the one hand, while the United 
States is unlikely to completely forsake NATO – even Donald Trump’s mercurial 
temperament notwithstanding – the chorus in Washington will only grow louder that 
America’s rich, developed allies in Europe should carry more of the costs of their own 
security. For a United States that has no intention of giving up international-systemic primacy 
                                                     
24
 One silver lining to such developments is that it can be easier to develop broad-based public support for 
coherent national strategy when there is a direct, defined “threat” than multiple abstract “risks” (Edmunds 2012; 
Blagden 2018a). That said, Brexit and its domestic fallout may have comprehensively undermined any gains on 
this front, in terms of national political unity and associated strategic coherence. 
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if it can be avoided (Porter 2018b), even despite others’ rise, getting its capable allies in 
regions that do not contain a true peer-competitor to US power – which is true of Europe but 
not of Asia – to provide the bulk of their own defence makes good sense. And if the US does 
eventually give up strategic primacy, because of the rise of other powers, then the Europeans 
will be left with little choice either way. Russia’s diminished strategic salience to the United 
States could therefore present an unpleasant paradox for America’s European allies, Britain 
foremost among them. For despite contemporary Russia being much weaker than the Cold 
War USSR was, it could present just as great a security challenge for European NATO 
powers as the Soviet Union did if Euro-NATO must do the lion’s share of the balancing 
itself, with only bounded and conditional US support.  
On the other hand, British efforts to prop up US hegemony carry risks of 
entanglement in regions of only peripheral interest to the UK, with potential for “chain-
ganging” into others’ conflicts.
25
 The recent British push to forward-deploy naval forces in 
Singapore, make defence commitments to Japan, and join US-orchestrated freedom-of-
navigation operations in contested areas of the South China Sea are all motivated by a desire 
to demonstrate UK influence in upholding the “rules-based” (i.e. Western-dominated) 
international order from which Britain has benefitted (Hemmings and Rogers 2019). Yet 
however much it is packaged as simply an apolitical “upholding” of impartial “rules”, such 
military commitments necessarily place Britain within a US-led balancing coalition directed 
at China – for rules to be “upheld”, the interests of the actor “breaking” them must 
necessarily be countered – with all of the escalatory risks that that relationship carries 
(Goldstein 2013). This risk could even be more pronounced for Britain, if – say – Beijing 
decided that a UK warship was an appropriate proxy target against which to assert its 
counter-Western preferences without guaranteeing the full blowback that would follow an 
attack on a US naval vessel. And on top of all this, any military asset deployed in East Asia to 
issue warm words about upholding “rules-based order” is necessarily a scarce asset not 
deployed on other, more pressing balancing tasks against more UK-proximate threats in the 
Euro-Atlantic region, as per the previous point.  
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The final three points are largely corollaries to the preceding two, and can be 
summarised more succinctly. Third, therefore, a multipolar world is more likely to be prone 
to interstate military crises with the potential to embroil UK interests (Blagden 2015, 341). 
Whereas a unipolar world features one great power capable of decisively tilting the balance 
of any militarised interstate dispute that it cares to join – and simultaneously, if necessary – 
that would no longer be true in a multipolar world. Beyond the general NATO-Russia and 
US-China contexts already discussed, potential flashpoints abound: in the Baltic and Black 
Seas, around Svalbard, in the Eastern Mediterranean and Gulf, around the India-Pakistan and 
India-China borders, on the Korean Peninsula, in the Taiwan Strait, in the South Atlantic, in 
parts of Africa, and many more. But ultimately, the point here is not to provide an exhaustive 
“laundry list”; the point is to illustrate that in a multipolar world, many more potential 
conflict dyads in contested locations will contain at least one party that no longer feels 
sufficiently encumbered by the potential for countervailing action by a sole superpower. And 
in many of these contexts, the potential exists for British interests to be affected and for 
London to therefore face stark choices over conceding such interests or risking potentially 
escalatory entanglement. 
Fourth, a multipolar world is unlikely to be a world conducive to arms control or 
counter-proliferation efforts (Blagden 2015, 341-42). The unipolar world was not universally 
conducive either, of course – in demonstrating that it would topple regimes that it opposed 
even if they had already relinquished weapons of mass destruction, as it did in Iraq and 
Libya, the superpower strengthened the case for nuclear deterrence among otherwise-weak 
US adversaries (the fates of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi did not go unnoticed in 
Pyongyang). Nonetheless, for those states that avoided enmity with the unipole, the Western 
hegemonic system produced relatively few pressures for horizontal or vertical proliferation. 
A multipolar world, by contrast, may produce more such incentives, insofar as more states 
are likely to face powerful adversaries that they are not confident they can deter through 
conventional arms alone. The competitive major-power rivalries of a non-unipolar system 
may also make cooperative arms control harder to sustain; the recent unravelling of the US-
Russia Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty looks ominous in this light (Bodner 
2019). Of course, productive arms control measures can occur in multipolar and bipolar 
systems, as seen via the Hague Conventions of 1899/1907, the naval treaties of 1922-36, and 
the various force limitation agreements of the Cold War – yet in all such parallels, states 
refused to relinquish critical means of defending their survival (or defected from treaties once 
there was a seemingly existential security rationale for doing so), illustrating the appeal that 
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the ultimate means of deterrence (nuclear arms) will hold in an era of resurgent interstate 
competition. And again, such developments could negatively affect UK security interests. 
Britain is hardly some righteous opponent of nuclear arms – indeed, if multipolarity is 
returning with some of the consequences described here, its own nuclear deterrent will be 
more salient once again – but it would still face real risks from both the collapse of great-
power arms control and/or nuclear proliferation to fragile regimes.  
Fifth, albeit following from previous points, a return to competitive multipolarity 
could once again see contestation of the global “commons” – air, sea, space – that America 
has commanded since 1990 (Blagden 2015, 342). Many assumptions of UK strategy, 
meanwhile, have followed from this presumed structural “fact” of such Western command. 
Military forces have been configured around power projection rather than gaining sea/air 
control against adversaries capable of contesting them, as for thirty years, UK forces have 
operated in an environment in which “NATO” (i.e., the United States) has supplied such 
control with ease (Blagden 2018b). Nowhere is this more apparent than the Royal Navy, 
which has just commissioned the two large new aircraft carriers promised by the 1998 SDR 
while having halved the frigate/destroyer, hunter-killer submarine, and mine-
countermeasures fleets from the numbers specified by the same Review. Such carriers are no 
bad thing in themselves – indeed, well screened and equipped carriers are themselves 
valuable tools of sea/air command – but the decimation of the other sorts of naval forces 
necessary to escort carriers and secure sea control against adversaries’ denial efforts belies a 
maritime posture that simply presumes a Western-dominated lake.  
Beyond force composition, such assumptions are similarly pervasive in other aspects 
of UK strategy (Blagden 2018b). For example, as 2011’s Libya campaign exposed – and as 
an outgoing UK Joint Forces Commander recently lamented (Jones 2016) – British stocks of 
munitions, spares, fuel, and technical expertise have been run down to unprecedentedly low 
levels, premised on “just-in-time” resupply from global markets and private contractors, as if 
defence was a “normal” business. Such assumptions may have maximised efficiency when 
engaging in expeditionary wars against minor powers, à la the “GWoT”, but they could be 
cruelly exposed against a state adversary capable of (a) identifying such an obvious 
vulnerability and (b) targeting supply lines effectively. The same goes for the consolidation 
of UK forces into a few large bases, again for financial efficiency reasons, with such bases 
and associated command/control nodes lacking meaningful air defence. And looking beyond 
military capacity, everything from the vast majority of goods trade to fibre-optic internet 
cables and GPS satellites resides in those erstwhile uncontested commons. Yet all such 
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conditions, while often treated as some permanent new reality of international politics, have 
in fact been a direct benign consequence of unipolarity and – on the UK-specific dimensions 
– intimate alliance with that unipole. If such unipolarity erodes, therefore, then such 
conditions may also erode with it. Britain depends on sea lines of communication (SLOCs) 
not only for its economic prosperity but also for its military capacity and indeed its 
population’s survival. Even a modest uptick in contestation of the maritime commons could 
therefore bring profound consequences for Britain, especially if/when it occurs in the UK’s 
Euro-Atlantic home region.  
 
The Way Forward: Polarity, Prudence, and Precision 
Since 2014, UK strategic discourse has been replete with references to resurgent state-based 
competition, bringing the post-Cold War interregnum of “abnormal” major-power relations to 
a close. From around 2018, moreover, the term “multipolarity” itself has begun to appear in 
official policy statements. Such recognitions are not before time: the ongoing shift of 
economic, political, and military power from Western Europe and North America to 
emerging, non-Western states is the most important dynamic in contemporary international 
politics. This was true even during the period of Britain’s self-inflicted embroilment in the 
Afghan and Iraq campaigns, of course – as scholars noted a decade ago (Blagden 2009) – but 
at least the drawdown from such GWoT-era commitments coupled to the shock of Crimea 
has pushed UK defence to once again contemplate concerns beyond COIN and 
counterterrorism.  
 While discussions of state-based threats, peer adversaries, and a multipolar world are 
back in vogue, however, such terms are not being used with clarity or consistency. Such 
ambiguity is both unsurprising and understandable. As Zala has demonstrated, “polarity” in 
the discourse of policymakers rarely means the same thing as is meant by political scientists. 
Like any speech about politics, the language is itself political. British national strategy is 
caught between wanting to continue to consume the fruits of a US unipolar system while also 
wanting to claim the social role of a “power” for itself – and all while beginning to recognise 
that Western hegemony is itself waning. Under such circumstances, while it is good that 
policymakers and the analytical community that surrounds them are beginning to contemplate 
the UK security implications of the return of multipolarity, it is also unremarkable that the 
term itself is being used to mean all things to all people. The discourse of “multipolarity” as it 
exists in Britain today thus reflects enduring concerns over national standing along with fear 
over a seeming multitude of threats from terrorists to hackers, from climate change to the 
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collapse of “liberal order” …as well as the specific meaning recognised by realist theory, 
namely growth in the capabilities of potentially hostile states to the point where they are 
capable of balancing the pre-existing powers’ interests.   
 If Zala’s contention is correct on a positive-explanatory level, then, what normative-
prescriptive recommendations follow? If “polarity” is being used so expansively, in other 
words, how should it be made more precise? Of course, neither policymakers nor scholars 
can be expected to possess crystal balls. Efforts in the present to precisely forecast the exact 
future configuration of systemic polarity in, say, 2050 – or even a mere decade from now, at 
the start of the 2030s – are likely to be unsatisfactory. Economic growth trajectories can be 
approximated with at least some insight, of course. But the path between strong economic 
growth potential and system-structuring national power is so fraught with contingency as to 
make definitive polarity projections circumspect.
26
 Just as this article has equivocated about 
the precise configuration of polarity now emerging, therefore – whether that be genuine 
multipolarity (balanced or otherwise), some form of US-China bipolarity, or simply a diluted 
form of unipolarity at the global level that is no longer full unipolarity within certain regions 
(i.e. where “local poles” are capable of balancing the US in a way that they still cannot in the 
wider world) – it is perfectly acceptable for policymakers to do the same.  
 Nonetheless, while it is perfectly forgivable to not know exactly what a post-unipolar 
future will look like, it is less forgivable to be imprecise about what multipolarity would even 
mean. Britain is not a pole and will not be again, despite banal efforts to code it as such 
through nebulously-defined “soft” power resources (Giannangeli 2015). But it remains a 
major power – and not simply on vague ideational grounds, but also on specific structural 
criteria (Monteiro 2014, 43-45; Blagden 2018b). London’s suite of diplomatic, military, 
intelligence, financial, scientific, and cultural levers remains substantial. Such power is most 
concentrated in its home region, however, while it dissipates through projection – as is true 
for any country, of course, even the mighty United States (Porter 2015). The contemporary 
UK can thus be thought of as a regional major power with a bit of extra-regional influence, 
albeit with efforts to stretch that extra-regional influence serving to drain home-regional 
capability (this holds for any state, so it is not a pejorative judgement).  
For such a country, thinking rigorously about what a change in global polarity would 
mean – and adopting structural precision about what “polarity” actually is as a precursor to 
this – will be fundamental to fashioning prudent national strategy for a post-unipolar age. So 
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many traits of the post-Cold War international system that have been assumed to be 
progressive, irreversible developments by many strategists and scholars alike – the overriding 
preoccupation with countering terrorism, the seeming authority of international law and 
institutions, unchecked Western power projection in the name of liberal-humanitarian causes, 
a free-flowing and Western-controlled maritime “commons”, a Western-dominated 
internet/satellite communications infrastructure, and so forth – have in fact been products of 
the “unipolar moment”. We do not know quite what configuration of polarity is coming next, 
but it is probably fair to say – at the very least – that the acuteness of post-1990 US 
unipolarity is now waning; China, Russia, and even India all have much less developed 
economies, but they also have access to new denial capabilities and, unlike Washington, are 
not trying to project hegemonic power into all regions of the world simultaneously.  
If such unipolarity is indeed waning, meanwhile, then fundamental premises of UK 
strategic posture and conduct will require reappraisal. For while British policymakers now 
acknowledge relative power shifts, national strategy continues to reflect unipolar habits. The 
reification of the NATO two-percent/GDP defence spending threshold within UK politics, 
following a government calculation that there is neither public nor parliamentary appetite to 
forego other areas of social spending – regardless of the deteriorating security environment – 
represents a political constraint on power-balancing symptomatic of a state that has not been 
its own security guarantor for a very long time.
27
 The recent “Global Britain” enthusiasm for 
dispatching scarce warships and aircraft to the “Indo-Pacific” – an absurdly expansive 
“region” spanning two-thirds of the globe, with ample scope for escalation and entanglement 
– to “project influence” and “uphold rules” even while NATO and UK-national commitments 
alike go unfilled in the Euro-Atlantic area similarly belies a role-obsessed state that has 
forgotten (but may painfully rediscover) the constraints of the balance of power.
28
 The 
contradictions of Britain’s China policy – bandwagoning in the hope of economic gain, 
through allowing the penetration of critical national infrastructure (e.g. nuclear power and 5G 
internet) by Chinese firms to the irritation of Washington, while joining the US-led counter-
China balancing coalition in Asia to the annoyance of Beijing – are further symptomatic of a 
state rusty in the hard trade-offs of major-power politics. So too the provision of diplomatic 
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support for Ukrainian NATO membership, and military/financial support for the Ukrainian 
effort to expel Russian occupation, only to be aghast when Moscow engages in similarly 
militarised coercion of Britain in return.
29
 Finally, the Brexit indulgence tells of a country 
deeply flippant about – and cosseted from – the dangers of an anarchic international system.
30
 
For no power that was thinking seriously about the return of a multipolar threat environment 
would embark willingly on a project that risks shrinking its own economy (and associated 
capacity for both military spending and productive investment), damaging its own 
constitution, dividing its own polity, paralysing its own government, estranging its own 
proximate and powerful allies, weakening the purchasing power of its own currency, 
increasing its own dependence on capricious patrons,
31
 compromising its own EU-adjoined 
territories/bases,
32
 undermining its own fragile internal peace,
33
 and quite possibly breaking 
itself apart (if Scotland and/or Northern Ireland are driven to secede).
34
  
In short, if multipolarity really is returning – as HM Government’s own policy 
statements now proclaim – then British strategy needs to become less fixated on performative 
identity, and more focused on defending vital interests through careful husbandry of national 
power while prudently eschewing unnecessary entanglements.
35
 Prudence – Hans 
Morgenthau’s “supreme virtue” of statecraft (1973, 12) – counsels recognition that all 
political actions entail consequential trade-offs, however worthy their motive, and also that 
there are limits to humans’ ability to predict and control outcomes (Harriman 2003; Porter 
2016, 257-8). As such, following the analysis of the potential consequences of unipolarity’s 
erosion offered above, prudent UK strategy for navigating a multipolar system must be 
selective in its ranking of interests – especially where they imply confrontation with the 
interests of other powerful actors – while also strengthening national capacity to deter and, if 
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necessary, prevail against emergent dangers. Prioritising the threats to balance against based 
on their relative proximity, power, offensive wherewithal, and inferred probability of UK-
targeted hostile intent (Walt 1985) – rather than the adolescent absolutism of demanding 
equal opposition to all violations of Western preferences – would be a good place to start, 
even while also making the case for a regenerated pool of national capabilities. If the UK 
strategy community manages this sooner rather than later, Britain may just have a chance of 
preserving its security, prosperity, and even its much-coveted major-power status through a 
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